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THE V0CTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
BY CHARLES GIOVANETTI
Professor Leach in his casebook on future inter-
ests1 states that no difficulties are generally encoun-
tered in the law concerning reversions except where
there is an attempt to give one's heirs an interest
which, had there been no such gift, would have passed
them as a reversion. The technical difficulty that
arises in such a situation is created by the so-called
doctrine of worthier title. The doctrine stood for the
proposition that a conveyance inter vivos or a gift by
will to the heirs of the grantor or testator or to his
next of kin of the same estate which they would take as
heirs or next of kin by inheritance, was void, since
they took by inheritance or succession rather than
by the deed or will. 2 In effect this common law
rule provided that one could not create a remainder
in his own heirs and what purported to be a remainder
was really a reversion. At common law this rule oper-
ated as a rule of law and was applied regardless of the
grantor or testator's interest. 3 Thus a conveyance from
A to B for life, the remainder to the heirs of A had
the same effect as if the remainder to A's heirs had
not been included. The words were treated as mere sur-
plusage.
The doctrine was not only applicable to inter
vivos conveyances and devises of realty but also ap-
plied to personalty. 4 It is interesting to note here
that the Rule in Shelley's Case which had its founda-
tion in similar feudal conditions as the doctrine of
worthier title did not apply to personal property.5 The
rule has been said to have been broader with reference
to devises than with inter vivos transactions because
it also applied where the devise was to persons who
were heirs of the testator., even though described by
name. 6 In inter vivos conveyances if the remainder were
1 - Leach, Cases on the Law of Future Interests P. 3.
2 - 3 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property 85.
3 - Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); Nossaman, 24 Cal. S. B.J. 61.
4 - I Simes, The Law of Future Interests 264; In Re Estate of Warren, 211 Iowa 940,
234 N.W. 825 (1931); Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170,
256 N.Y. S. 563 (1932); Re-Statement, Property, Sec. 314 (1).
5 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 264.
6 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 314, Con J.
made to a named person who subsequently became an heir,
the rule did not apply. 7 It was applicable even if the
conveyance to the heirs was made subject to a condition
precedent. 8 It is thought that a conveyance of an execu-
tory interest to the heirs does not come within the rulf
rul e. 9
The reasons stated for the rule were various. It
was said that the heirs take by intestacy rather than b3
devise because title by descent was the worthier title.
Also stated was the reason that the law having deter-
mined how title should pass, the act of the grantor or
devisor is construed as a vain and fruitless attempt to
give that to the heirs which the law itself vests in
them; it is speaking what the law speaks. These two
reasons have been criticized as being inapplicable to
conveyances since if, after a conveyance, the grantor
conveys to a stranger the question would not be whether
the heir takes by descent or by purchase, but whether
the heir takes by purchase or the stranger takes by
purchase. 10 Still another reason was probably the at-
tempt to prevent the defeat of creditors of th-e grantor
by a conveyance to the heirs in remainder.11 The two
main reasons, however, which gave the rule its formid-
able foundation at common law were Lord Coke's theory
that the heirs were part of the ancestor's body while
living 12 and the protection of the feudal obligations
of relief, wardship, and marriage of which the feudal
overlord would have been deprived if the heirs took by
purchase. 13 Both of these reasons founded on feudalis-
tic concepts having b~come obsolete it would seem that
the rule should have disappeared. In England the rule
was abolished by statute. 14 In the U.S. only one state
has appeared to have abolished it by statute 15 The
proposed Uniform Property Act of the American Law In-
stitute abolishes it both as to inter vivos transactions.
and as to devises. 16
The rule has persisted in the U.S. generally as a
7 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 314, Cam C; 1 Simes, Law of Futare Interests 264.
8 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 263, Restatement Property, Sec. 314 Corn. F.
9 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 263.
10 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 261.
11 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 261.
12 - Co. Litt. 22b.
13 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 262 Restatement Property, Sec. 314, Com. A.
14 - Stat. 3 & 4 Wn. IV c. 106, Sec. 3 (1833).
15 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 3 & 4 (1) Sepcial Note.
16 - A.L.I., Proposed Uniform Property Act, Sec. 14 & 15.
rule of construction, 17 although there are some instances
where it has continued as a rule of law. 18 The adoption
of the rule as one of construction was largely due to
the opinion of Cardozo, J. in Doctor v. Hughes where the
rule was based on the presumed intent of the donor not
to surrender his power of disposition. Although as a
rule of law it defeated the intent of the testator, 19 it
is held that its continuance as a rule of construction
is due to a prevalence in modern times to effectuate the
intention of the conveyor when no good reasdn requires
its frustration. 20 Critics of the continuance of the
doctrine as a rule of construction state that to adopt
it as one of construction i.s to defeat the express in-
tention of the grantor to create a remainder in the
heirs. 21 The New York courts while giving lip service
to the rule as enunciated by Justice Cardozo have, in
subsequent cases under similar sets of facts, evaded it
by finding an expression of contrary intent. 22
Justice Cardo.zo in his establishment of the doc-
trine as a rule of construction states that there could
be times when such gifts could be held to be remainders
to heirs, "but at least the ancient rule survives to
this extent, that to transform into a remainder what
would ordin-arily be a reversion, the intention to work
the transformation must be clearly expressed. " 23 Just
what would be a manifestation of such a contrary inten-
tion is not intimated in the case itself. The Restate-
ment of Property 24 seems to indicate that the means for
manifesting such a contrary intention are limited. Two
means there illustrated are: 1. A provision that the
heirs are to take by purchase and not by descent. 2.
An attempt by the grantor to make a complete disposition
of his property. The second reason seems to have been
the basis of some New York cases 2 5 to hold that there
has been a manifestation of the grantor's intentiop so
as to rebut the presumption of an intention to retain
the reversion arising when the doctrine is applied as
17 - Doctor v: Hughes, supra; I simes, Law of Future Interests 265; Restatement,
Property, Sec. 314. Con A.
18 - Ellis v. Page (Mass.), 7 Cush. 161 (1851); King & Wife v. Dunham, 31 Ga. 743 (1861);
Miller v. *Fleming, 18 D.C. (7 Mackey) 139 (1889) West Tenn. Co. v. Townes, 52 F
(2d) 764 (N.D. Miss. 1931).
19 - Note 3, supra.
20 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 314, Coa. A.
21 - Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property B6, Note 6; Nossman, 24 Cal. S. B. J. 61.
22- 'Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929); Engel v. Guar-
anty Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E. (2d) 673 (1939); Richardson v. Richardson, 298
N.Y. 135, 81 N. E. (2d) 54 (1948).
23 - Doctor v. Hughes, supra.
24 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 314 Co,. E.
25 - Note 22 supra.
a rule of construction. These cases seem to be stronger
cases for holding that the grantor intended a reversion
in himself and they seem to bear out the critics 26 who
contend that when the doctrine is applied as a rule of
construction the courts say what the grantor didn't in-
tend what he said in express words
The continuance of the rule as one of construction
has been justified on two grounds; that it represents
the grantor's intent2 7 and on grounds of alienability. 2 8
The justification as to the grantor's probable intent
is stated to be based on the premise that the grantor in
making a gift over to the heirs intends the same thing
as if he had -given the property to his estate. 29 This
fails as to testamentary gift-s since the testator gen-
erally intends to dispose of everything. The argument
of freedom of alienability seems, to be stronger where
the rule is applied as one of Iaw. 30
In California it was thought that the doctrine
had not taken hold as a rule of construction 31 until it
reared its head in a recent case.' 3 2 Although no mention
of the rule 33 was made in the previous cases, the Gray
case has been cited as a situation where the rule does
not apply since the grantor intends a class of remain-
dermen which might differ from the heirs general. 34 The
recent California case adopts the rule as enunciated in
Doctor v. Hughes, while at the same time distinguishing
the two previous cases as falling within the limita-
tions to the rule. The case falls in line with the rule
as set forth in the Restatement of Property which de-
clares it to be valid as a rule of construction in con-
nection with inter vivos conveyances but not as to test-
amentary gifts. 35
26 - Note 21 supra.
27 - Cardozo, J. in Doctor v. Hughes, supra, "and seldom do the living mean to forego
the power of disposition during life by the direction that upon death there shall
be a transfer to their heirs."
28 - Restatement, Property, Sec. 314 Co. A; Bixby v. California Trust Co. 33. Cal. 471,
202 P (2d) 1018 (1949).
29 - Bixby v. California Trust Co. supra; Restatement, Property, Sec. 314 Com- .
30 - 1 Sines, Law of Future Interests 265; See Nossaman, 24 Cal. S. B. J. 63.
31 - Gray v. Union Trust Co. 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1915); Hotchkiss 5B Cal. App.
(2d) 445, 136 P (2d) 597.
32 - Bixby v. California Trust Co. supra.
33 - See 1 Stanford L.R. 774 (778).
34 - 1 Sines, Law of Future Interests 2661 Restatement, Property. Sec. 314 Con. C.
35 - Restatement, Property, Sec./ 314.
The significance of the doctrine today is generally
encountered in these situations:
1. To determine whether the life beneficiary of a trust,
who is also the grantor, has the entire beneficial in-
terest so as to enable him to revoke.what has been de-
clared to be an irrevocable trust.
2. To determine whether a subsequent conveyance of the so-
called remainder by the grantor is valid or not.
3. To determine whether creditors of the grantor can reach
the so-called remainder.
In all the above situations the doctrine when applied
construes the interest as a reversion and the result is
the successful termination of the suits in situations
(1) and (2) in favor of the grantor or his assigns and
in situation (3) in favor of the creditors.
Some courts have confused the doctrine with the
Bkule in Shelley's Case. Though it is entirely possible
that some of the same conditions of feudal society that
gave rise to the Rule in Shelley's Case were responsible
for the existance of the doctrine of worthier title, 7
the two rules were each applicable to distinct situatibns.
The former rule was confin-ed to limitations of an estate
of inheritance to the heirs of one who h.as taken under
the same instrument a prior estate of freehold, whereas
the latter doctrine was concerned with the acts of the
ancestor as between himself and his heirs. ,38 Another
reason given is that the doctrine of worthier title has
been applied where the other rule has been abolished by
statute. 3 9 There would seem to be no reason for confus-
ing the two rules except where the Rule in Shelley's
Case is followed by analogy.
36- Restatement, Property, Sec. 314 CorL n.
37 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 266.
38 - Doctbr v. Hughes, supra.
39 - 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests 266; 1 Stanford L.R. 774 (777).
